patches/packages/openssh-7.1p2-arm-1_slack14.1.txz
This update fixes an information leak and a buffer overflow. In particular,
the information leak allows a malicious SSH server to steal the client's
private keys. Thanks to Qualys for reporting this issue.
For more information, see:
https://www.qualys.com/2016/01/14/cve-2016-0777-cve-2016-0778/openssh-cve-2016-0777-cve-2016-0778.txt
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-0777
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-0778
*
* IMPORTANT: READ BELOW ABOUT POTENTIALLY INCOMPATIBLE CHANGES *
*
Rather than backport the fix for the information leak (which is the only
hazardous flaw), we have upgraded to the latest OpenSSH. As of version
7.0, OpenSSH has deprecated some older (and presumably less secure)
algorithms, and also (by default) only allows root login by public-key,
hostbased and GSSAPI authentication. Make sure that your keys and
authentication method will allow you to continue accessing your system
after the upgrade.
The release notes for OpenSSH 7.0 list the following incompatible changes
to be aware of:
* Support for the legacy SSH version 1 protocol is disabled by
default at compile time.
* Support for the 1024-bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange
is disabled by default at run-time. It may be re-enabled using
the instructions at
http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html
* Support for ssh-dss, ssh-dss-cert-* host and user keys is disabled
by default at run-time. These may be re-enabled using the
instructions at
http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html
* Support for the legacy v00 cert format has been removed.
* The default for the sshd_config(5) PermitRootLogin option has
changed from “yes” to “prohibit-password”.
* PermitRootLogin=without-password/prohibit-password now bans all
interactive authentication methods, allowing only public-key,
hostbased and GSSAPI authentication (previously it permitted
keyboard-interactive and password-less authentication if those
were enabled).
(* Security fix *)